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The record of economic well-being in the 1980s belied Reagan's clain
that Americans would be better off if they scaled back the welfare state
and cut tax rates. Though the standard of living rose, its grozoth was no

faster than during 1950-1980. Income inequality increased. The rate of
was the same as in 7980. Cutbacks in
poverty at the end qf Reagan's terin
income transfers during the Reagan years helped increase both poverty
and inequality. Changes in tax policy helped increase inequality but
reduced poverty. These policy shifts are not the only reasons for the
lack of progress against poverty and the rise in inequality. Broad social
and economic factors have been widetning income differences and making
it harder for families to stay out of poverty. Policy choices during the
Reagan Administration reinforced those factors.

One overarching goal of the welfare state is to promote and
ensure the economic well-being of its people. Since World War 11
the cohsensus-view in the United States has been that this goal
is best pursued by developing and expanding social welfare
policies concerned with income maintenance, health care, housing, education and job training, labor market outcomes, and
social services. The Reagan Administration challenged the consensus, arguing that the Nation's economic well-being would
be promoted more effectively by scaling back and reorienting
the modern social welfare state. Though Congress resisted the
massive cutbacks of social welfare spending proposed by the
Administration, it did acquiesce to substantial reductions relative to the trends of the 1960s and 1970s.
Did this shift in policy direction increase Americans' economic well-being, as Reagan's policy makers claimed it would?
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Did it make us worse off? Or, despite the heated debates and
political maneuvering, did it. make little difference either way?
To assess the general level of economic well-being in a society, we need answers to a relatively small set of questions:
What is the average level of economic well-being (the standard
of living)? Has it been increasing? How many people have standards of living that are unacceptably low? That is, what is the
level of poverty and what is its trend? How equitable is the
distribution of economic well-being, and is it becoming more or
less equitable? Because defining and measuring "equity" raise
insuperable problems, analysts usually rephrase this last questiort in terms of the level and trend of inequality of economic
well-being.
The first task of this article, then,, is to describe the changes
in poverty, inequality and the standard of living during the Reagan years, and compare them to trends of the prior 30 years.
These are the broadest indicators of economic well-being and
the ones most frequently used, but are hardly exhaustive. One
might also want information on life expectancy, infant mortality, hunger, homelessness, leisure, and related social indicators.
Because these three indicators omit important aspects of the
quality of life, one must always keep in mind they are indicative of economic weli-being, not human welfare.1
Poverty, inequality and the standard of. living are products of complex social and economic forces. Many, such as the
pace and nature of technological change, international economic
trends, and. demographic change, are largely outside the control of the public sector. Others, though, are not. Policy choices
about the size and nature of cash and noncash income support programs, oversight and regulation of the labor market
through minimum wage, antidiscrimination and other policies,
the development of human resources through public education
and job training programs, and the character of -the tax system
can significantly altei the distribution of income and level of
povert%. Depending on their. character, such policy choices can
counteract market-driven and demographic influences on poverty and inequality, or reinforce them.
To what extent did the changes in social welfare policies
during the 1980s produce the observed changes in poverty and
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inequality? To what extent were they products of more fundamental economic and social forces and, therefore, would have
occurred regardless of who held the Presidency and set the domestic policy agenda? The article's second task is to address
these questions,
Economic Well-Being Before and After Reagan Took Office
The Standard of Living
The quality of life depends partly on a person's consumption
of material goods and services, but also on intangibles such as
freedom, degree of security from crime and violence, the quality
of family and personal relationships, and spiritual contentment.
So, while we wquld like to know the trend in the average quality
of life before the Reagan era, and how it changed in the 1980s,
no one knows how to fully measure this concept. Instead, we
examine the material standard of living.
Column I of Table I shows the trend in real median family income measured by the Census Bureau. The 1980 value is
indexed to 100 as a convenient point of reference.
Although the trend in real median family income is a widely
used indicator of the.standard of living, it can be misleading for
several reasons. A growing fraction of Americans have chosen
to live alone, cohabit with partners or otherwise have living
arrangements that do not count as "families" according to the
Census Bureau definition. Looking at median family income
ignores the trend in income among the increa.ing portion of
the population living as "unrelated individuals.I Also, because
average family size has declined over time,.in recent years the
same real income can buy a higher standard of living for the
typical family. The trend in median family income does not
adjust for the decline in average needs.
To deal with these problems, column 2 shows the trend in
real median income after three adjustments. First, all income receiving units are included, not only families. Second, the income
of each unit is corrected with an "equivalency scale" that adjusts observed incomes for differences in the age structure and
size of families. Third, instead of counting each unit's equivalent income once to derive, the median, each person in the unit is
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Table 1
Trends in Real Median Income Under Alh'r'rntivze Measres of Income and
Reporting Unit, 1950-1988 (1980
1100)
Census Tl+Iu'aLi

Family [ncome
All Families
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1973
1975
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

Adjusted Family Income,
Person Weights, All Persons
NA
NA
NA
NA
87
96
93
103
100
98
97
99
102
104
108
109
112

NA = not available
Source: Column 1: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990b, tablt 727). Column 2: Karoly
(1990, table B.I).

assigned its equivalent income. The equivalency scale is the one
implicit in the federal poverty thresholds (discussed below). The
median is then computed over all persons. Each person, rather
than each family, carries equal weight. As in Column 1, the 1980
value of median "adjusted family income with person weights"
is indexed to 100. These data are not available for as long a period as the standard Census Bureau measure. (See U.S. House
of Representatives, 1990, pp. 1070-1071 for explanation of the
approach. Though an improvement compared to using median
family income, this approach is still problematic because the
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income concept used in the series excludes noncash forms of
income and does not deduct direct taxes.)
Real median family income grew steadily from 1950 to 1973
and nearly doubled over this period. The oil crisis of 1973 and
ensuing recession produced a sharp decline by 1975, but incomes recovered by 1979. The severe recession which began
in 1980 and continued during the early years of the Reagan
Administration drove median family income sharply down in
the early 1980s. Since 1982, median family income has gradually risen and in 1987 finally reached the level last experienced
in 1973.
From 1950 to 1980, the average growth rate of real median
family income was 2.1% per year. In contrast, during the eight
years of Reagan's term the annual growth rate was only 0.7%.
Compared to the prior 30 years, the Reagan era was not a prosperous one. On the other hand, it was far better than the trend
from 1970 to 1980, when real incomes stagnated.
The evidence in column 2 leaves a rather different impression of the Reagan years and how they compare with the 1970s.
The decline in income during the early 1980s appears less severe and the recovery looks much stronger. Real adjusted family
income grew at a rate of 1.4% during the Reagan years, twice
the rate in column 1. However, real adjusted family income
also-grew by 1.4% during the 1970s. Based on this income measure, then, the Reagan years did not produce an improvement
in the growth rate of the standard of living compared to the
prior decade.
Column 2 isprobably closer to the "truth." Because its income measure is based on reports from the entire population,
corrects for needs, and gives all persons equal weight, it better
captures the trend in the standard of living for the median resident of the United States. Under either measure, though, one can
reasonably conclude that on average people had higher incomes
when Reagan left office than when he entered, but that the Reagan years did not increase the growth rate of the standard of
living compared to its record over the three prior decades.
The 12% increase in living standards from 1980 to 1988 (from
column 2) was not uniformly enjoyed by all types of families.
For person in families with a married couple and childrdn, real
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mean adjusted family income rose 14.3%. For those in families
with a single mother and children, however, the real mean actually fell. 1.3% Among the nonelderly childless, it rose 11.3,;
among the elderly childless, it rose 13.0%.2
Incomne Inequality
Table 2 shows the trend in the distribution of income based
on a simple summary. measure of inequality: the ratio of total income received by the top 20% of the population to total income
received by the bottom 20%. Of the many ways to measure income inequality: this one has the advantage of being available
for the distribution of income.among families as defined by the
Census Bureau and for the distribution of adjusted family income with person weights. Thus, the columns in table 2 use the
same concepts of income and reporting unit as the corresponding columns in Table 1.
Column 1 shows that income inequality among families ex,
hibited little trend from 1947 until the- early 1960s, declined
modestly until the late 1960s, and increased modestly until 1980.
The Reagan years witnessed a sharp increase in inequality without precedent since 1920 (Williamson and l.indert, 1980, pp. 7677). The summary measure increased 18% between 1980 and
1988, to the highest value observed since 1947, when this data
series began. And it was higher yet in 1989.
The data in column 2 tell nearly the same story. Inequality
of adjusted family income rose slightly in the 1970s, and rapidly
in the 1980s. In contrast to-the pattern in column 1, inequality
crested in 1986-1987 and dropped slightly in 1988. (Information
for 1989 is not available.)
Poverty
The official measure of poverty is derived from a set of poverty lines which vary by household size, the age of the head
of the household, and the number of children under 18. (Until
1981, sex of the head of household and farm/nonfarm residence
were other distinctions.) The poverty lines are updated yearly
by the.percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, so they
represent the same real purchasing power each year. For 1988
the average line for a family of four was $12,092. If a family's'
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Table 2
Trends in Income Inequality Under Alternafite Measure of In:ome and
Reporting Unit: Ratio of Shar? of Top 20% to Share of Bottom 20%

1947
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1973
1977
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Census Bureau
Family Income
All Families

Adjusted Family Income,
Person Weights. All persons

8:6
9.5
8.6
8.6
7.9
7.6
7.5
8.0
8.0
8.2
8.4
9.1
9.1
9.1
9.5
9.5
9.5
9.6
9.7

NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
7.4
7.9
8.0
8.3
8.9
9.7
9.9
10.0
'10.3
10.3
10.3
10.0
NA

NA = not available.

Source: Culurnn 1, computed from dala in U.S. Bureau Of the Census (1989) for
1947-1987; U.S. llureau of the Census (1990a, p. 30) for 1988-1989. Column 2,
computed from data in U.S. I lousm of Representatives (1990, p. 1092).

annual income falls below its poverty line, its members .count
as poor.
The official poverty definition measures income by counting
cash income from all public and private sources, except capital gains. It does not take into account public or private noncash benefits such as food stamps, subsidized public housing or
employer-provided health insurance, nor does it subtracl taxes.
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Table 3.
Percentage of Persons in Poverty, 1959-1989

1959
1965
1969
1974
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Official Poverty
Measure

Official Poverty Measure
Adjusted for Selected
Noncash Transfers and Taxes

22.4
17.3
12.1
11.2
11.7
13.0
14.0
15.0
15.2
14.4
14.0
13.6
13.4
13.0
12.8

NA
NA
NA
NA
9.9
11.6
13.2
14.2
14.6
13.9
13.5
13.1
12.6
12.0
NA

NA = not available
Source: Column 1, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990a, p. 57); column 2, U.S. House
of Representatives (1990, p. 1042).

Yet both noncash benefits and taxes affect a family's standard
of living.
The first column of Table 3 shows the rate of poverty among
persons according to the official federal poverty measure. In
1959 22.4% of Americans were poor. In the next decade the
poverty rate declined dramatically to 12.1. After a small increase
-during the mild recession of the early 1970s, it decreased again
to 11.1% in 1973, the lowest level ever observed. The level of
poverty rose slightly in the mid and late. 1970s but was less
than 12% at the end of the decade. The economic downturn
during the early 1980s drove poverty sharply up. It peaked at
15.2% in 1983, the highest rate since 1965.:During the remainder

Changes
of Reagan's term, poverty gradually declined as the economy
expanded. By .1988 it had fallen merely 2.2 percentage points to
13.0%, higher than any year from 1968 to 1979 and equal t0 the
1980 level. A year later, the poverty rate was 12.8%, the same as
in 1968, and 31.5 million persons were poor, 3.2 million more
than in 1980.
Arnong major demographic groups, only the aged have
made sustained strides against poverty. Their 1988 poverty rate
of 12.0% was the lowest ever for this group and marked a'decline of 3.7 percentage points from 1980, just before Reagan Look
office. Poverty among children, in contrast, soared to more than
22% in 1983 and was 19.5% in 1988. This rate was 5.6 percentage
points greater than in 1969, the year when child poverty was
lowest, and 1.2 percentage points greater than in 1980. Children
are now the poorest age group in the United States, and have
been since 1974.
Poverty among blacks was 31.3% in 1988, 1.2 percentage
points lower than in 1980 but no lower than it was throughout
most of the 1970s. Among Hispanics, 26.7% were poor in 1988,
1.0 percentage points greater than in 1980. And arong whites,
the 1988 poverty rate of 10.1% was virtually identical to the
3
1980 rate.
Column 2 of Table 3 shows the recent trend in poverty using a modified measure of income in conjunction with the same
official poverty lines. Means-tested noncash transfers from the
federal food stamp, school lunch and housing programs are valued at their estimated private market cost and added to the income measure. Medical benefits are not included because there
remains substantial disagreement about ]low to properly measure their value to low income persons. Federal income taxes
and the employee share of federal payroll taxes are subtracted.
(See U.S. House of Representatives, 1990, pp. 1038-1039 for further detail.)
Because low income persons receive most food and housing
benefits and pay relatively few income and. payroll taxes, these
adjustments lower the poverty rate in each year by between 0.5
and 1.4 percentage points. They do not, however, significantly
affect the trend during the Reagan years. the poverty rate still
peaked in 1983, then declined slowly. One minor difference is
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that in 1988 it was slightly greater than in 1980. According to
this measure, there were 29.2 million poor persons in 1988, 3.2
million more than in 1980. (Data for 1989 are not yet available.)
Economic Well-Being During the Reagan Years: The Bottom Line
A central tenet of Reagan's 1980 campaign was that Americans would be better off economically if they scaled back and
reoriented the modern social welfare stale, and cut marginal
tax rates. Bowing to the ensuing political mandate, Congress
launched a great experiment to test this dairn by cutting back
the expansion of social welfare expenditures and passing major
tax cuts. How did it turn out?
Not very well. On the positive side, the standard of living
rose. But its growth rate was no faster than during the 19501980 period, and persons in families with a single mother and
children were, on average, worse off in 1988 than 1980. The
gap between the most and least affluent widened substantially.
Indeed, the gap widened so much that, even though real median.income rose, the average real income of persons in the
bottom fifth of the adjusted family income distribution declined
by about 2% between 1980 and 1988 (U.S. House of Representatives, 1990, p. 1092).
The deterioration in economic well-being among lower income persons was best captured in the poverty statistics. The
level of poverty at the end of Reagan's term was identical to
its level in 1980. Throughout the Reagan years, poverty affected
a larger percentage of Americans than in any year from 1968
to 1979.
If there is a "Big Tradeoff" between equality
and efficiency
(Okun, 1975), the efficiency oriented policies of the Reagan Administration, pursued at the expense of efforts to directly reduce
poverty and income differences, might have been expected to
pay off by producing more rapid growth in the standard of living. From this perspective, the record of poverty and inequality
in the 1980s may not be surprising. What is surprising is the failure of median adjusted family income to rise faster than during
the 1970s, a decade widely perceived as economically stagnant,
and one when social welfare spending rose rapidly.
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Did Reagan's Policies Make Poverty and Inequality Worse?
This section presents evidence on the extent to which the
changes in poverty and inequality can be attributed to changes
in income maintenance and federal tax policy enacted during
the Reagan years. The analysis concentrates on these policies
because they directly affect the net incomes of many families.
Other recent changes in social welfare policy have affected poverty and inequality by altering the distribution of market
income. For example, federal policies on financial aid for college students affect attendance choices and, consequently, adult
earnings. These more indirect effects are difficult to detect, have
received little attention, and so will not be discussed.
Accounting for Changes in Poverty Between 1980 and 1988
Three basic factors drive changes in poverty. Changes in real
earnings and other private sources of income (market income)
affect "market poverty," the number of persons who are poor
if only their before-tax market incomes are counted. Second,
because income support programs and taxes alter most families'
market incomes, changes in these policies affect the number of
poor after transfers and taxes are counted in income, given the
level of market poverty. Third are demographic factors. Overall
population growth would increase the number of poor even
if the rate of market poverty and the impact of transfers and
taxes on poverty did not change. Demdgrnphic shifts towards
groups with higher (lower) than average rates of poverty would
tend to increase- (decrease) the overall level of poverty, other
things equal..
Table 4 shows how much of the 3,184,000 increase in the
number of poor persons between 1980 and 1988 can be accounted for by each of these components.4 The measure of poverty is identical to that in column 2 of Table 3, which includes
benefits from food and housing programs in income and subtracts major federal taxes.
A clear story emerges. Gains in market incomes during this
period acted to reduce the number of poor by 973,000. The net
effect of changes in federal tax policy was to further reduce
the number of poor by 450,000 in 1988. t'he Tax Reform Act -of
1986 eliminated income tax liabilities for nearly all poor pers'ons
and families and expanaed the earned income tax credit. The
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Table 4
Between 1980 nid 1988
Sources of (he Increase in ihe Poverty Populaunld
Change in number of posttransfer, positax poor due 1o:
Market income changes
Social insurance program changes
Means-tested program changes
Federal tax changes
Average population growth
Demographic shifts and other
Total increase

-973,000
250,000
1,734,000
-450,000
2,163,000
460,0(10
3,184,000

decline in poverty produced by these reforms was partly- offset
by increases in Social Security taxes.
Cutbacks in social insurance and means-tested transfer programs, in contrast, raised the number of poor by 1,984,000.
Without this increase, the rate of poverty would have been 0.8
percentage points lower in 1988-below the 1980 value instead
of above it. Cutbac'ks in means-tested benefits were responsible
for the bulk of the increase. Controlling for changes in market
incomes; government transfers and federal tax policy, simple
population growth plus other demographic factors would have
added 2,623,000 poor persons.
The cutbacks in welfare programs, especially AFOC and
food stamps, were championed by the Reagan Administration
as a means to reduce dependency and encourage work. Success
in these objectives was minimal, and at the high cost of increasing poverty. The increase was particularly felt among persons in
single parent families with children. The cutbacks pushed more
than 1.1 million of them below the line and raised their rat of
poverty by 3.9 percentage points.
Though federal welfare policy changes under Reagan bear
much of the responsibility for helping to increase poverty, the
states are also partly responsible. During 1980-1988 most states
allowed their AFDC benefits to fall in real terms, thereby further
reducing the antipoverty effectiveness of this important element
of the safety net.
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Accounting for Changes in incorne Inequality
Gramlich, Kasten and Sammartino (1900) have analyzed the
impact of federal taxes and cash transfrs on inequality of adjusted family income with person weights during the 1.980-1990
period. (This is the same income concept as-in column 2 of Table
2.) For 1990, they compare the pretax, pretransfer distribution of
income to the posttax, posttransfer distribution to compute [he
impact of taxes and transfers on inequality. Then, the analysis
holds the distribution of pretax, pretransfer income at its 1990
level and adjusts taxes and transfers to what they would have
been if 1980 policies had remained in effect, but benefits and
taxes had kept pace with the growth of other incomes. This procedure isolates the effects of policy changes from other economic
and demographic changes between 1980 and 1990. The impact
on inequality is then recomputed. Table 5 displays the key findings using the Gini-coefficient, a measure of inequality ranging
from 0 to 1, wi-th smaller values indicating less inequality.
Table 5
Impact of Federdl TxLs and Transfers on Inconie Inequalily (A'hasured by
the Gini Coefficitct)

1980 Market Incomes,
Transfers and Taxes
1990 Market Incomes,
Transfers and Taxes
1990 Market Incomes,
1980 Transfers and Taxes

Pretax,
Pretransfer
Incomes

Posttax,
Posthansfer
Incomes

Decline
Due to
Transfers
and Taxes

.473

.395

.078

.523

.463

.060

.523

.452

071

Source: Gramlich, Kasten and Samnimartino (1991), tables 4, A.

Comparing rows 2 and 3 shows that inequality of posttax,
posttransfer income would be slightly less if the 1980 transfers
and taxes had remained in place. The 1980 policies would have
reduced the Gini coefficient by. 071; the actual 1990 policies
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reduce by. 060 or 15% less. Most of this decrease can be traced to
a decline in the redistributive impact of federal taxes caused by
large reductions in marginal income tax rates for persons with
high incomes combined with increased payroll tax rates for low
and middle wage earners. Again the message is clear: changes
in tax and transfer policy during the Reagan years contributed
to the increase in inequality.
On the'other hand, these changes have played a relatively
small role in the overall increase in inequality since 1980. The
observed posttax, posttransfer Gini coefficient rose from .395
to .463, or by .068. With 1980 policies in place, the rise would
still have been .057, only 16% less. The surge in inequality since
the late 1970s owes far more to broad labor market and other
economic factors than to shifts in tax and transfer policy.
The Policy Verdict
Did policies enacted during the Reagan Administration
make poverty and inequality worse? Yes. Cutbacks in transfer
benefits helped increase both poverty and inequality. Changes
in federal tax policy helped increase inequality but, on balance,
reduced poverty.
At the same time, it would be a serious mistake to attribute
the lack of progress against poverty and the increase in inequality entirely to these policy shifts. The extent of poverty and
inequality is determined by many social and economic force
besides social welfare policy. Beginning in the mid to late 1970s
and coitinuing throughout the 19,80s, strong, poorly understood
market and demographic forces have been widening income differences in the U.S. and making it harder for families to stay out
of poverty. Even if 1980 tax and income transfer policies had.
remained in place, the 1988 poverty rate based on adjusted income would have been 11.2%, 1.3 percentage points higher than
it was in 1979. And the Gini coefficient for income'inequality
would have been. 057 higher in 1990 than in 1980.
No politically feasible set of transfer and tax reforms could
have fully counteracted these market and demographic factors
(Grarnlich, Kasten and Sammartino, 1990, p. 18). Perhaps the
policy response would have partly done so if persons holding traditional views of the welfare state's function had been
in control. Instead, the temper of the times and the character
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of the Reagan Administration produced policy choices which
reinforced those factors.
Implications for Poverty and Inequality in the Future
The rise in inequality is receiving greater public recognition
and has emerged as a target for Democratic politicians. These
political developments, in concert with continued concern about
the deficit,have, as of this writing, thwarted Bush Administration proposals to reduce the capital gains tax, and are creating
pressure to modestly raise tax rates on high income persons.
The disequalizifig effects of the 1980s changes in the income
tax, therefore, will probably not continue and may be reversed
to a small degree.
Child support obligations will be more widely respected and
enforced in the 1990s. This will help reduce poverty and welfare dependence among single parent families. In addition, the
work-oriented welfare reforms of 1988 will become more widely
implemented in the 1990s and are likely to make a small contribution towards reducing poverty among such families. There
also appears to be increasing concern that ghetto poverty (the
"underclass") and poverty among children can no longer be neglected. Major initiatives to address these problems have not vel
been adopted, but may.emerge in the next- few years.
In a fiscally conservative climate, it may well be possible to
reshape tax and social welfare policies in a manner that reduces
the level and growth of spendihg while preserving or even extending their antipoverty and equalizing impacts. The Reagan
Administration and Congress chose not to try. The recent past,
however, does not necessarily portend the future. There are
grounds for thinking that policy developments in the 1990s will
not contribute to greater poverty and inequality, and may even
help reduce them. If so, the American welfare state will return
to its long-standing function of preserving and enhancing the
economic well-being of its inhabitants.
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House of Rel,'c-lentatives (1)(1 pp. 1031-t53) Ilstatistically deceeii'pcwc
the change into several componvits, the ara ysi: I rid t s each change irdependently. lilt i11
reality cheig's in
ritOe COmlpoiineI affect the cllt'rs. iFor
example, transfc' and taxe,. allect work deflrl. 'hice of liviny arrelegements and lamily structure, amidl hence, the distriblitic of ma,'kel inl llrcic,.
Market incomn, opportunities affect demographic choices and vice v rica.
Thus, [lie finnlii
gs do nol necessarilI show the c -irctnl efh.t I el each
factor ill tlt, decompositionc. Despite this qualiliation, the fieli r:;are
suggestive of the importante c lofhe
various fdOc'Ir.

